Performance evaluation of HIP-based network security solutions by Okwuibe, J. (Jude)
DEGREE PROGRAMME IN WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS ENGINEERING
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF HIP-BASED
NETWORK SECURITY SOLUTIONS
Thesis author
Jude Okwuibe
Thesis supervisor
Prof. Mika Ylianttila
Approved / 2015
Grade
Okwuibe J. (2015) Performance Evaluation of HIP-based Network Security So-
lutions. University of Oulu, Department of Communications Engineering. Master’s 
Degree Programme in Wireless Communications Engineering. Master’s Thesis, 63 p.
ABSTRACT
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) is a networking technology that systematically sepa-
rates the identifier and locator roles of IP addresses and introduces a Host Identity
(HI) name space based on a public key security infrastructure. This modification
offers a series of benefits such as mobility, multi-homing, end-to-end security, sig-
naling, control/data plane separation, firewall security, e.t.c. Although HIP has
not yet been sufficiently applied in mainstream communication networks, indus-
try experts foresee its potential as an integral part of next generation networks.
HIP can be used in various HIP-aware applications as well as in traditional
IP-address-based applications and networking technologies, taking middle boxes
into account. One of such applications is in Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS),
VPLS is a widely used method of providing Ethernet-based Virtual Private Net-
work that supports the connection of geographically separated sites into a sin-
gle bridged domain over an IP/MPLS network. The popularity of VPLS among
commercial and defense organizations underscores the need for robust security
features to protect both data and control information.
After investigating the different approaches to HIP, a real world testbed is im-
plemented. Two experiment scenarios were evaluated, one is performed on two
open source Linux-based HIP implementations (HIPL and OpenHIP) and the
other on two sets of enterprise equipment from two different companies (Tem-
pered Networks and Byres Security). To account for a heterogeneous mix of
network types, the Open source HIP implementations were evaluated on differ-
ent network environments, namely Local Area Network (LAN), Wireless LAN
(WLAN), and Wide Area Network (WAN). Each scenario is tested and evaluated
for performance in terms of throughput, latency, and jitter.
The measurement results confirmed the assumption that no single solution is
optimal in all considered aspects and scenarios. For instance, in the open source
implementations, the performance penalty of security on TCP throughput for
WLAN scenario is less in HIPL than in OpenHIP, while for WAN scenario the
reverse is the case. A similar outcome is observed for the UDP throughput. How-
ever, on latency, HIPL showed lower latency for all three network test scenarios.
For the legacy equipment experiment, the penalty of security on TCP throughput
is about 19% compared with the non-secure scenario while latency is increased by
about 87%. This work therefore provides viable information for researchers and
decision makers on the optimal solution to securing their VPNs based on the ap-
plication scenarios and the potential performance penalties that come with each
approach.
Keywords: Host Identity Protocol, Security Control and Data Acquisition, Vir-
tual Private LAN Services, Security.
Okwuibe J. (2015) HIP-pohjaisten tietoliikenneverkkojen turvallisuusratkaisujen 
suorituskyvyn arviointi. Oulun yliopisto, tietoliikennetekniikan osasto, Degree 
Programme in Wireless Communications Engineering. Diplomityö, 63 s. 
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Koneen identiteettiprotokolla (HIP, Host Identity Protocol) on
tietoliikenneverkkoteknologia, joka käyttää erillistä kerrosta kuljetusprotokollan 
ja Internet-protokollan (IP) välissä TCP/IP-protokollapinossa. HIP erottaa 
systemaattisesti IP-osoitteen verkko- ja laite-osat, sekä käyttää koneen identiteetti 
(HI) -osaa perustuen julkisen avainnuksen turvallisuusrakenteeseen. Tämän 
hyötyjä ovat esimerkiksi mobiliteetti, moniliittyminen, päästä päähän (end-to-end) 
turvallisuus, kontrolli-informaation ja datan erottelu, kohtaaminen, 
osoitteenmuutos sekä palomuurin turvallisuus. Teollisuudessa HIP-protokolla 
nähdään osana seuraavan sukupolven tietoliikenneverkkoja, vaikka se ei vielä 
olekaan yleistynyt laajaan kaupalliseen käyttöön. 
HIP–protokollaa voidaan käyttää paitsi erilaisissa HIP-tietoisissa, myös 
perinteisissä IP-osoitteeseen perustuvissa sovelluksissa ja verkkoteknologioissa. 
Eräs tällainen sovellus on virtuaalinen LAN-erillisverkko (VPLS), joka on laajasti 
käytössä oleva menetelmä Ethernet-pohjaisen, erillisten yksikköjen ja yhden sillan 
välistä yhteyttä tukevan, virtuaalisen erillisverkon luomiseen IP/MPLS-verkon yli. 
VPLS:n yleisyys sekä kaupallisissa- että puolustusorganisaatioissa korostaa 
vastustuskykyisten turvallisuusominaisuuksien tarpeellisuutta tiedon ja kontrolli-
informaation suojauksessa. 
Tässä työssä tutkitaan aluksi HIP-protokollan erilaisia lähestymistapoja. 
Teoreettisen tarkastelun jälkeen käytännön testejä suoritetaan itse rakennetulla 
testipenkillä. Tarkasteltavat skenaariot ovat verrata Linux-pohjaisia avoimen 
lähdekoodin HIP-implementaatioita (HIPL ja OpenHIP) sekä verrata kahden eri 
valmistajan laitteita (Tempered Networks ja Byres Security). HIP-implementaatiot 
arvioidaan eri verkkoympäristöissä, jota ovat LAN, WLAN sekä WAN. Kaikki 
testatut tapaukset arvioidaan tiedonsiirtonopeuden, sen vaihtelun (jitter) sekä 
latenssin perusteella  
Mittaustulokset osoittavat, että sama ratkaisu ei ole optimaalinen kaikissa 
tarkastelluissa tapauksissa. Esimerkiksi WLAN-verkkoa käytettäessä 
turvallisuuden aiheuttama häviö tiedonsiirtonopeudessa on HIPL:n tapauksessa 
OpenHIP:iä pirnempi, kun taas WAN-verkon tapauksessa tilanne on toisinpäin. 
Samanlaista käyttäytymistä havaitaan myös UDP-tiedonsiirtonopeudessa. HIPL 
antaa kuitenkin pienimmän latenssin kaikissa testiskenaarioissa. Eri valmistajien 
laitteita vertailtaessa huomataan, että TCP-tiedonsiirtonopeus huononee 19 ja 
latenssi 87 prosenttia verrattuna tapaukseen, jossa turvallisuusratkaisua ei 
käytetä. Näin ollen tämän työn tuottama tärkeä tieto voi auttaa alan toimijoita 
optimaalisen verkkoturvallisuusratkaisun löytämisessä VPN-pohjaisiin 
sovelluksiin. 
Avainsanat: koneen identiteettiprotokolla, SCADA, virtuaalinen LAN-
erillisverkko. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
By and large, enterprises are looking for various ways to optimize the customer expe-
rience, improve visibility, and maximize efficiency across the value chain. There is a
global need for cost-effective networks that easily support an expansion plan with an
adequate level of security and efficiency. To meet these objectives, enterprises oper-
ating from geographically dispersed sites require a shared Ethernet broadcast domain
among different sites. Interconnecting sites through a pseudo-wire to emulate a point-
to-point connection over packet-switching networks is one way to achieve this objec-
tive, however, this approach could be prohibitively expensive when enterprise offices
are distributed across different continents. A growing number of enterprises are, there-
fore, leveraging on the use of Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS) to offer Virtual
Private Network (VPN) services across geographically dispersed sites. Such VPNs
rely on already existing Internet infrastructure to provision as the public network that
interconnects the geographically distributed private networks.
As an IP based network, all hosts and their locations on the Internet are identified 
using only their IP addresses. The idea of allowing a host and its location to be iden-
tified using only an IP address has been the design of the Internet architecture since 
early networks. This approach becomes somewhat inefficient with the ever increasing 
density of mobile hosts and will become even much more inconvenient with the advent 
of “The Internet of things” and next generations of networks. Mobile hosts frequently 
change their locations and so also their IP addresses, hence supporting real-time ap-
plications such as VoIP may experience adverse interruptions with such IP address 
changes. A similar limitation is experienced for multihoming networks, because upon 
IP address change, communicating hosts will need to re-authenticate before reestab-
lishing their connections. Other possible challenges with this architecture is its sus-
ceptibility to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and the ease of impersonation through 
IP address forgery [1].
HIP was developed as an internetworking architecture that separates the locator/iden-
tifier role of IP addresses and introduces a cryptographic host identity to serve the 
role of IP address at the transport layer [1, 2, 3, 4]. Since after it was standardized 
by IETF in 2000, HIP has been adopted by several telecommunications vendors and 
operators for internal activities. Open-source versions such as HIPL [5] and OpenHIP 
[6] are also available for different platforms and have been very useful to several 
research projects and industrial applications.
One key application area of HIP is in Virtual Private LAN Services (VPLS), as a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN), VPLS networks are prone to various kinds of security 
threats such as Denial of Service (DoS), Distributed DoS (DDoS), TCP reset attack, 
and IP spoofing. Several measures and architectures have been proposed and imple-
mented to enhance the performance of VPLS services [7, 8, 9], however most of 
these architectures are still not able to provide the required level of security for 
clients on VPLS networks. Scalability is another issue of concern with early VPLS 
solutions, given that they were mostly flat architectures, hence could effectively 
support small to medium scale networks but unable to support larger networks [10].
In [10], authors proposed a hierarchical VPLS architecture based on Host Iden-
tity Protocol (HIP), named Hierarchical HIP enabled virtual private LAN Service
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(H-HIPLS). This architecture provides some vital features that would enhance the 
security of the VPLS network, these features include authentication, confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, secure control protocol and robustness to the known attacks. 
It also sets to improve scalability on the control, forwarding, and security plane by 
minimizing the number of keys stored at the nodes as well as the number of estab-
lished tunnels. Other proposed architectures include HIP-enabled Virtual Private LAN 
Service (HIPLS) [11], Session key based HIP VPLS (S-HIPLS) [9], and 
Hierarchical VPLS (H-VPLS) [8, 12]. Generally these architectures are still lacking in 
scalability in one or more planes. H-VPLS for instance is lacking in security plane, 
HIPLS is lack-ing in control, forwarding, and security planes, while S-HIPLS is 
lacking in control plane [9].
In this thesis, four separate scenarios are evaluated, two are Linux-based open source
HIP implementations and the others are two sets of enterprise security equipment from
separate manufactures. These network scenarios were evaluated for throughput, jitters,
and latency. Hence we are able to analyze the effectiveness of these approaches and
the corresponding costs on the performance of the network.
This thesis work is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides information on the
HIP architecture and its various applications, it also covers the architectural modifi-
cations of HIP and their corresponding impacts on the initial HIP design. Chapter 3
provides details on the fundamental concepts of VPN and how these functions can
be implemented at different layers of the OSI. Chapter 4 focuses on VPLS as a use
case of VPN, it covers the different types of VPLS, their architectural limitations, as
well as security issues. It further presents information on various HIP-enabled VPLS
implementations and a comparison of different architectures. Chapter 5 covers the ac-
tual testbed implementations for open-source Linux based HIP implementations and
enterprise-based VPLS solutions, it also presents the analysis of experimental results
for each scenario. Chapter 6 covers the discussions relative the experiment outcomes
and the industrial applications of each solution, it further sheds more light on the fore-
seeable future trends of various HIP solutions. Chapter 7 presents an overall summary
of the thesis work.
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2. Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
HIP was approved by IETF as a host identification technology capable of separating 
the locator roles and end-point identifiers of IP addresses [2, 9]. Other than HIP, there 
are several other proposals on IETF designed to address similar security and mobility 
concerns like HIP, however these other proposals provide only partial solutions. Lo-
cator Identifier Separation Protocol (LISP) for instance, mainly provides scalabilty for 
the routing system. HIP however, provides a more comprehensive approach to secur-
ing end-to-end connections for mobile and multihoming devices [1, 2].
This identifier/locator split is the bed-rock of HIP and is viewed by industry experts 
as a major tool for revolutionizing the internet architecture. The HIP technique was 
significantly spurred by the advancement in public key cryptography and the increase 
in computational resources of hosts, hence host identities are secured using crypto-
graphic mechanisms [1].
Technically, the use of HIP eliminates the need for IP addresses, instead of IP ad-
dresses, incoming packets use cryptographic host identifiers which are generated by the 
hosts themselves. This is basically straightforward in normal cases, but when it comes 
to meeting certain security policy requirements, then it could be a lot more complex. 
Moreover different network scenarios and their respective security requirements need 
to be taken to consideration when deciding how data is handled on the network [13].
Figure 1. HIP base exchange.
HIP nodes (initiator and responder) authenticate through a four-way handshake called 
Base Exchange (BEX). By exchanging Diffie-Hellman keys in the 2nd and 3rd pack-
ets, and authenticating the parties in the 3rd and 4th packets as shown in Figure 1 [13], 
the four-way handshake makes HIP resilient to DoS attacks. The l1 packet initiates the 
authentication process, it uses a minimal HIP header to avoid memory intensive oper-
ation. A HIP-aware DNS provides the l1 packet with Host Identity Tags for both the 
initiator and the responder. The R1,l2, and R2 messages implement the standard au-
thenticated Diffie–Hellman (DH) key exchange procedure. For a given set of peers, 
the DH public value is calculated as
DHresp = gxmodp
DHinit = gymodp (2.1)
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where g = 2, p is a standard large prime number, and x,y ∈ [1, p−2] are self-generated 
random values of the peers. The DH secrete is a shared key calculated by each peer as
Kresp = DHxinit,and
Kinit = DHyresp (2.2)
i.e., Kinit = Kresp = gxymodp [13, 14].
During BEX, Security Associations are exchanged between nodes before setting up 
an IPsec tunnel for secure data exchange [15]. The use of IPsec to implement HIP 
is perceived by industrial experts as the ideal HIP implementation procedure. IPsec 
pro-vides a cryptographic-based security for IP traffic on the network using 
Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocols. 
AH authenticates data origin and ensures the integrity of IP packets while ESP which 
is mostly applied in combination with AH, provides confidentiality and encryption 
services as well as integrity assurance. However, the integrity assurance from ESP 
does not cover the IP header fields except in cases where the header fields are 
already encapsulated using ESP.
HIP Architecture
The HIP architecture is based on the identity/locator split concept, hence HIP intro-
duces a new layer between the transport and network layers of TCP/IP layered model as 
shown in Figure 2 [1]. The role of this new layer is mainly to perform identity/locator 
splitting based on public key using Host Identity (HI) name space. A Host Identity Tag 
(HIT) is a 128-byte harsh of HI, this could be used by applications as an alternative 
to IPv6 address. The fixed length of HIT provides consistent format for the protocol 
for all cryptographic algorithms and simplifies the management of packet size cost 
[4]. Notwithstanding, HITs are only routable at the overlay on top of IP and not on 
the IP layer itself, hence using them as replacements for IPv6 can only happen on the 
application layer [2].
With identity/locator split, the IP address continues to serve as locator while Host 
Identifiers serves for identity [4]. This architectural modification with HIP offers 
dif-ferent benefits to both hosts and network operators, these include easing out 
mobility and multihoming across different address families, end-to-end encryption, 
eliminating the need to re-authenticate with an end hosts when moving between two 
domains con-trolled by different Network Address Translation (NAT) devices. Earlier 
HIP architec-tures relied on end-to-end signaling for key management and IP mobility 
management between pairs of end-hosts. These architectures were faced with major 
scalability is-sues originating from the terminal-based control which requires a high 
network and computational overhead on both the user and the access network, hence 
HIP solutions were only suitable for small to medium size networks and not for larger 
networks. The need to extend the benefits of HIP to larger networks resulted in some 
modifications to the initial HIP architecture. Two of these modifications are covered in 
this section; the Ultra Flat Architecture and the Hierarchical architecture [16, 14, 10].
12
Figure 2. HIP architecture.
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3. VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS (VPNs)
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a communication environment created through 
the controlled segmentation of a shared communications infrastructure to emulate the 
characteristics of a private network [17]. VPN supports a closed community of 
autho-rized users, providing them a secure access to various network related services 
and re-sources even when they are cast far around the world [17, 18]. As shown in 
Figure 3, a typical VPN consists of multiple private networks and remote users 
interconnected over a public network such as the internet. Early VPNs relied on 
the use of tradi-tional leased line technologies such as T1 and T3, however when 
sites are spanned across wider geographical locations, dedicated private lines 
become prohibitively ex-pensive to maintain. At present, VPN connections can run 
through almost any internet connection, these includes dial-up, Digital Subscriber 
Line (DSL), wireless, and satel-lite. These technologies leverage on the economics of 
scale to provide more affordable VPN services to customers.
Figure 3. VPN Connectivity.
In [17], author describes three primary types of VPN services; LAN Interconnect 
VPN services, Dial-up VPN services, and Extranet VPN services. LAN Interconnect 
VPN provides network services for geographically dispersed sites over a shared net-
work infrastructure. Dial-up VPN provides point-to-point-like VPN services to mobile 
and telecommuting employers, allowing them to access the company’s Intranet from 
remote locations as shown in Figure 3. Extranet VPN is an architectural hybrid of 
LAN interconnect and dial-in VPN, however as an extranet, it enables external ven-
dors, suppliers, and customers to access specific areas of the company’s intranet called 
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
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VPNs have been categorized in very many different ways [19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. In 
[19], author presents a comprehensive approach to categorizing VPNs, this is illus-
trated in Figure 4, with this approach, the provisioning agent is considered paramount, 
hence categorizing VPNs primarily into Provider Provisioned VPNs (PPVPNs) and 
Customer Provisioned VPNs.
Figure 4. VPN classification.
3.1 Provider Provisioned VPNs (PPVPNs)
Provider provisioned VPN is the most common form of VPN in the industry at present. 
Here the core VPN functionality is configured and managed by the network service 
provider. Figure 5 presents a typical PPVPN connectivity showing the interconnec-
tion of multiple VPNs in an extranet. The goal is for service providers to securely 
deliver data and extend connectivity over one or more shared networks, with prede-
fined s ervice l evel a ssurances. P PVPNs c ould o perate o n e ither l ayer 2  o r l ayer 3, 
however the generic requirement for all provider provisioned VPN technologies are 
described in [24]. This document was prepared by the design team in the PPVPN 
working group. The goal is to develop generic requirements for PPVPNs. These re-
quirements are in three distinct categories, namely service, provider, and engineering 
requirements. These requirements are independent of any particular type of PPVPN 
technology, hence all PPVPN technologies are expected to meet the requirements 
stated in this document. These requirements are also independent of the deployment 
scenario. However, these requirements may differ based on the number of providers 
provisioning the VPN, i.e. single or multiple provider networks and/or Autonomous 
Systems (ASes). Requirements specific to layer 2 PPVPNs are contained in [25], while 
those specific to layer 3 PPVPNs are contained in [26].
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Figure 5. Provider provisioned VPN connectivity.
3.2 Customer Provisioned VPNs
A rare but evolving way to implement VPN is the Customer Provisioned VPN. Here 
the customer becomes the VPN service provider, thereby overseeing the configuration 
and management of the VPN [19]. As shown in Figure 6, a typical customer provi-
sioned VPN is designed to technically separate the connection service of the provider 
from the VPN service, here instead of having the network service provider also provid-
ing the VPN services, the customer is able to use special networking equipment that 
allows for managements and provisioning of a VPN by the customer. A use case of 
this approach is evaluated in the implementation phase of this thesis. Companies like 
SnapGear and Tempered Networks are producing specialized hardware solutions that 
provide commercial-grade VPN services at commodity prices. Tempered Networks 
for instance provides hardware solution for protecting industrial control systems and 
devices, this solution consists of three main components: segmentation, secure con-
nectivity and remote monitoring, and managing third-party connections [27]. 
These three together effectively eliminate the need for a service provider to be 
involved in the VPN management. Several benefits come with this approach. First, 
given the same level of security in terms of encryption and encapsulation 
mechanisms, this approach is invariable one step ahead in the security race, this is 
because it eliminates all security threats associated with a third party unlike the 
PPVPN approach. However secure the network is designed to be, the provider still has 
access to all data transmitted over their network infrastructures, hence posing a major 
concern on data confidentiality. 
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Other benefits associated with this approach include flexibility, cost-effectiveness, 
and high availability.
Figure 6. Customer provisioned VPN connectivity.
Another widely used paradigm to categorizing VPNs is based on the layer where
they are implemented. Typical VPNs are implemented on network and data link lay-
ers, implementation in other layers such as application and physical layers are also
possible. However in this section, the focus is on Layer 2 VPN (L2VPN) and Layer 3
VPN (L3VPN), we study their security and tunneling mechanisms as well as the net-
work scenarios they are the most suitable for supporting.
3.3 Layer 2 VPN (L2VPN)
Layer 2 VPN is implemented at the link-layer of shared network infrastructure based 
on a switched link-layer technology like Frame Relay (FR) and Asynchronous Transfer 
Mode (ATM) [17]. A typical L2VPN is shown in Figure 7 [28]. In this model, L2VPN 
A represents a point to point service while L2VPN B represents a bridge service. There 
are three categories of services associated with the L2VPN framework; Virtual Private 
Wire Services (VPWS), Virtual Private LAN Services (VPLS), and IP-only LAN-like 
Service (IPLS) [20, 28]. The implementation work in this thesis is based on VPLS, 
hence the next chapter presents a detailed study of this group of services and why it
17
is a more sought-after option for implementing VPNs, we also cover its architectural
limitations and security concerns.
Figure 7. Layer 2 VPN Connectivity.
3.3.1 Virtual Private Wire Services(VPWS)
VPWS is a point-to-point service where Customer Edges (CEs) are interconnected via 
point-to-point virtual circuits. Each CE device in VPWS has a set of point-to-point vir-
tual circuits which are used to interconnect with another CE device, hence frames are 
directly transmitted from one source CE device to a destination CE device irrespective 
of the content [20]. VPWS makes the integration of existing Layer 2 and Layer 3 
ser-vices possible on a point-to-point basis across a service provider’s IP/MPLS cloud 
[29]. As shown in Figure 8, VPWS is limited in its inability to support 
multipoint-to-multipoint communications.
3.3.2 IP-only LAN-like Service (IPLS)
IPLS is specially designed for transmitting only IP packets. It is a special case of 
VPLS where CE devices are hosts and routers instead of switches. IPLS services 
can only support IP-based packets such as Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packets, hence other non-IP-based Layer 2 
packets are not supported [20, 28]. However, IPLS still stands as the suitable 
solution for scenarios where MAC address learning capabilities are not required for 
the VPLS services, hence user data are restricted only to IP. PE devices 
interconnected using IPLS implement multipoint connectivity for IP traffic using 
either discovery where each PE device discovers IP/MAC address association for 
attached CE devices for each IPLS instance or Pseudowire (PW) for Unicast Traffic, 
in which case a PE device sets up a pseudo-wire called Virtual Circuit Label 
Switched Paths (VC-LSPs) to each of the other PEs that supports the same IPLS-
instance [20].
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Figure 8. Virtual private wire service.
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4. VIRTUAL PRIVATE LAN SERVICES (VPLS)
Virtual Private LAN Services is a multipoint layer 2 VPN that provides bridged LAN 
services to CEs that are members of the VPN, hence allowing CEs that belong to the 
same service category to behave as though they were connected through a bridged 
LAN. VPLS is sometimes referred to as Transparent LAN Service or Virtual Private 
Switched Network Service [7]. As a private LAN service, VPLS ensures that only 
CE devices belonging to the same VPLS instance are able to interact. PE devices 
per-form control driven interactions to discover all other PEs on the same VPLS, 
through this interaction they are able to exchange demultiplexors. In contrast to 
VPWS which offers point-to-point services, VPLS supports Ethernet based 
multipoint-to-multipoint communication over IP or MPLS (Multiprotocol Label 
Switching) based cooperate networks, hence most enterprises and organizations are 
more inclined to adopt VPLS instead of VPWS. VPLS also provides high-speed 
connectivity over Layer 3 (L3) provider network as well as other advanced auto 
discovery features [30, 20].
Figure 9. VPLS Connectivity.
Figure 9 is a typical VPN using LDP signaling as illustrated by Martini and Kom-
pella in [31]. In this illustration, two separate customers (Customer A and Customer
B) each operating from multiple sites spread across a metro or wide area are provided
VPN services by the same provider over an MPLS cloud. The goal of the provider is
to emulate the need for a dedicated switch to each customer. To accomplish this, the
CE devices of two customers from different sites are grouped together and each group
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is assigned a single PE device. However on the management platform, each customer
is assigned a particular access VLAN different from other customers, this way all traf-
fic belonging to customer A irrespective of the site is only accessible from VLAN-1,
the same holds for customer B, hence making the MPLS cloud appear like a dedi-
cated switch to each customer. Although for some providers, the configurations might
be more complex than this especially when multiple providers are involved, however
the basic idea remains the same, hence giving service providers a scalability option to
leverage on the economics of scale to provide VPN services to multiple customers over
the same set of equipment, making services more affordable for customers.
The ability of VPLS to merge multiple LANs into a single virtual LAN is made 
possible through the incorporation of MAC address learning, flooding, and forward-
ing functions in the pseudowires that connect the individual LANs across the packet 
switched network [7]. VPLS could provide optimal solution for connecting multiple 
customer sites, especially for customers who wish to connect a relatively high number 
of sites with very few users per site to a corporate LAN or when high number of routers 
need to be interconnected without involving the provider in the customer routing [20].
To establish a VPLS, mesh of LSPs is pre-established between all the PEs participat-
ing in the VPLS instance. This could be done manually or by the use of a provisioning 
system or signaling protocols. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) currently has 
two standard frameworks for building VPLS, these frameworks differ predominantly 
in their control planes, particularly the signaling techniques i.e. the protocol used to 
set up the MPLS tunnel and distribute labels between PEs, and auto-discovery, i.e. 
what technique is used to enable multiple PE routers in the same VPLS instance to 
discover each other. Based on these two broad criteria, IETF have standardized VPLS 
over LDP [8] and VPLS using BGP for auto-discovery and signaling [7]. The 
follow-ing sections discuss the dynamics of these two approaches, how they differ, 
and the respective suitable scenarios they support.
4.1 VPLS Using BGP for Auto-Discovery and Signaling
This draft was proposed in 2007 by Kompella and Rekhter and was standardized by 
IETF. The draft describes the functions required to offer VPLS, a mechanism for sig-
naling a VPLS, the auto-discovery of the endpoints of a VPLS as well as the rules 
for forwarding VPLS frames across a packet switched network [7]. One 
distinguish-ing feature of this approach is the auto-discovery and signaling mechanism 
which uses BGP as the control plane protocol. This document also covers the possible 
options for deployment with regard to the decoupling of functions across different 
devices. Unlike the approaches described in [32] and [33] which offer point-to-point 
Ethernet services across packet switched networks, this approach offers multipoint 
services.
4.1.1 BGP VPLS Operation
To set up a BG VPLS according to the approach in [32], a network administrator needs
to first pick an RT for the VPLS, this RT will be used by all the PEs in the VPLS. To
configure a particular PE, the network administrator only needs to choose the VE ID
V for the PE, however for cases where the given PE is connected to a u-PE, then there
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may be need for multiple VE IDs. Such PE could also be configured with a Route
Distinguisher (RD) to avoid it generating a unique RD for the VPLS.
4.1.2 Hierarchical BGP VPLS
Scalability is a key property that makes VPLS a viable option to offer VPN services
to multiple customers. BGP allows for the scalability of the control plane in a VPLS.
Scalability requires that the operations performed on the VPLS are kept to the barest
possible minimum, hence for BGP to offer control plane scalability on a VPLS, three
key aspects are put to consideration: 1. Minimizing the mesh connectivity among the
VPLS BGP speakers. 2. Restricting the message passing of the BGP VPLS to only
the intended speakers. 3. Removing the complexities involves in adding and deleting
a BGP speaker on the VPLS.
One comprehensive approach to addressing these three issues is by using BGP for
internet routing and IP VPNs. This technique is hierarchical and relies on designating
a set of fully meshed Route Reflectors (RRs) and establishing a BGP session between
each BGP speaker and one or more RRs [34]. By so doing the problem of having all
BGP speakers connected in a fully meshed topology is solved. In a situation where the
service provider needs a large number of RRs, this technique can also be applied re-
cursively to create another level of RRs which still tenders the need for full mesh. This
also removes the complexities involved in adding and deleting multiple BGP speakers.
4.2 VPLS Using LDP Signaling
This draft was also proposed in 2007 by Lasserre and Kompella and has equally been
standardized by IETF. It is important to mention that this standard performs a similar
function as the one described in the previous section, hence they are both referred to as
VPLS. However, they differ in the signaling protocols they use, and thus not compati-
ble with each other. As a VPLS, this standard also relies on the use of pseudowires to
emulate a LAN segment for a given set of users by creating a Layer 2 broadcast domain
through which MAC address learning and forwarding is carried out on the Ethernet. It
is also possible for a single provider to offer multiple VPLS services on the same set of
PE nodes. The standard proposed in this document is an extension of the pseudowire
label signaling on the control plane using LDP [33].
Just as we have in traditional LANs, when multiple sites on a VPLS are set on the
same broadcast domain, it is expected that all packets (unicast, multicast, broadcast)
are forwarded to the right locations. Therefore there is always a need for MAC address
learning and aging on each pseudowire. Flooding and packet replication as described
in the previous section will still be required with this standard. In [35], authors describe
how Layer 2 frames are carried over point-to-point pseudowires, this draft describes
how Ethernet/802.3 and VLAN 802.1Q traffic are transported across multiple sites on
the same Layer 2 broadcast domain or the same VPLS. It is equally possible to apply
this model to 802.1 technologies. This proposal presents a concise and scalable way
to offer VPLS without need for address resolution servers or other external servers as
described in [25].
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VPLS Operation and Encapsulation Actions
As shown if Figure 10, the VPLS in this example is set up between PE1, PE2, and 
PE3. It is set to connect customers across four depicted sites, A1 - A4 using CE1 -
CE4 respectively.
Figure 10. Operation of VPLS with layer 2 aggregation.
From this configuration, one can infer that the initial VPLS instance was between 
PE1, PE2, and PE3 using the full mesh of Ethernet PWs. This VPLS instance is 
assigned a VPLS ID accordingly. To illustrate a typical VPLS operation, we assume 
that PE1 signals a PW label 54 to PE2 and 55 to PE3, and PE2 signals PW label 64 to 
PE1 and 65 to PE3. Assume that a packet from A1 with a source MAC address M1 
and destination MAC address M2 is bound for A2. On leaving C1, we assume the PE1 
is unaware of the location of M2, then it must flood the packet to PE2 and P E3. On 
receiving this packet, PE2 will notice that it has a PW label of 64, hence the source 
MAC address M1 must be behind PE1, given that it distributed the label 64 to PE1 and 
by logical assumption it can associate the MAC address M1 to PW label 55 [33].
For this VPLS, when the customer Ethernet frame comes without a preamble, then
it is encapsulated with a header as described in [35]. To determine the encapsulation
need for a frame, two basic rules are applied:
1. If upon arrival at the PE the frame is already encapsulated with a customer frame
and is also used by the local PE as a service delimiter, then the encapsulation is
preserved as the frame is sent to the VPLS since this information is required to
identify the customer and the particular service of that customer. An exception
to this case is when the requested VLAN ID is signaled, in which case the VLAN
tag is overwritten before the frame is sent out on the PW.
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2. If upon arrival at the PE the frame is already encapsulated, but this encapsulation
does not have appropriate VLAN tag, then a null tag is imposed if the VLAN ID
optional parameter is not signaled.
Hence a customer frame may arrive at a customer-facing port with a VLAN tag that 
identifies both the customer’s VPLS instance and VLAN, the encapsulation of such tag 
is preserved. A VPLS could have both Ethernet and Ethernet VLAN PWs, however 
if the PE is unable to support both, then it needs to send a label release on the PW 
messages that it cannot support with a status code "Unknown FEC" as required in  
[36][8].
4.3 Security Considerations
The VPLS standards discussed in previous sections both have general and unique secu-
rity considerations. Given that VPLS is aimed at ensuring data privacy, these security
concerns pose major threats to both the customer and the service provider networks.
For instance, a man-in-the-middle eavesdropping can alter the transmitted data stream.
For the general case, both approaches are still exposed to lack of data confidentiality
and privacy which is typical of VPLS since it does not offer authentication. A more de-
tailed description of the security issues involved in L2VPNs is covered in [37]. To se-
cure such communication, all PE-to-PE tunnels in the provider network are encrypted
with IPsec. To further improve security, the end systems in the VPLS sites may need to
encrypt all data using appropriate technique before sending through the provider net-
work. Generally, the security concerns for both VPLS standards are categorized into
two main aspects; data plane security and control plane security.
4.3.1 BGP based VPLS
Securing the control plane of VPLS is very crucial to achieving data privacy, if the con-
trol plane is not properly secured, then chances are the transmitted data is misplaced
on the way or worse still sent to an eavesdropper. For a BGP based VPLS, all the ex-
changes on the control plane are done via BGP messages. To enhance the security of
such BGP messages, certain techniques such as TCP extension are are used to authen-
ticate BGP messages as described in [38]. Using this approach, the TCP carries an
MD5 digest as extension, MD5 is a widely used cryptographic harsh function when it
comes to verifying data integrity. Each segment sent on a TCP will contain a 16-byte
MD5 digest, this MD5 acts like a signature for the TCP segment and since it uses in-
formation known to only the end systems, it becomes an effective way for the BGP
to protect itself from spoofed TCP segments that might be introduced into the stream.
For a spoofing attack to be successful on this scheme, the attacker would not only have
to guess the TCP sequence number, but would also need to guess the password in-
cluded in the MD5 digest which is even more challenging since this password is never
displayed on the connection stream and could take different forms depending on the
application in use.
Not withstanding, the effectiveness of this technique is limited when it comes to
concerted attacks. For instance, it may not help in keeping VPLS label private, and
with full knowledge of the labels, it is possible for an intruder to eavesdrop on VPLS
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traffic, however such intruder will also require access to the data path within the service 
provider network and this underscores the need to equally secure the data plane of a 
VPLS [7].
For data plane security, the provider must ensure that all PE-to-PE tunnels on the
VPLS are well controlled and verify that VPLS labels are coming from valid interfaces.
Validity of an interface depends on the devices involved, for instance a valid interface
for a PE comprises of links from P routers while for an ASBR, a valid interface is a link
from an ASBR in an AS that is part of a given VPLS. In [39], authors described two
key tunnel security mechanisms based on MPLS, namely MPLS-in-IP and MPLS-in-
GRE, using such tunnels to secure VPLS packets according to this description require
IPsec, otherwise IP address filtering becomes the only means of ensuring that packets
exiting PEs were rightfully placed by the proper tunnel head node.
4.3.2 LDP based VPLS
Similar to BGP based VPLS, using LDP also requires security on both the data and
control planes of the VPLS. In addition, this standard also specifies a special technique
for addressing DoS attacks.
On the data plane, per VPLS L2 FIB table and per VPLS PWs are used to ensure 
traffic isolation between VPLS domains. Again to ensure data security, customer traffic 
is first e ncrypted a nd/or a uthenticated b efore g etting t o t he p rovider n etwork, since 
these packets remain unchanged as they move through the VPLS. The use of routers 
as CPE devices could help prevent broadcast storm. Another way to achieve this is by 
controlling and regulating the amount of broadcast traffic from each customer [8].
For control plane security, various LDP authentication methods are specified in [36]. 
The goal of this approach is to prevent the disruption of PEs by unauthenticated mes-
sages. LDP messages are categorized as follows [36]
1. Discovery messages: Used to announce and maintain an LSR in a network.
2. Session Messages: Used for session establishment, maintenance, and termina-
tion between LDP peers.
3. Advertisement Messages: Used to create, change, and delete label mappings for
FECs.
4. Notification Messages: used for error signaling and advisory.
To avert DoS attack, it is imperative that service provider minimizes the number of
MAC addresses known by each PE in the VPLS network.
4.3.3 Other Considerations
Generally, the HIP technology provides a network layer security alternative to standard
security technologies like Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security
(TLS). HIP works favorably well with any transport protocol, its ability to handle host
mobility and perform multihoming makes it a more desirable alternative to TLS which
does not support such services. As far as security goes, technologies like TLS are more
vulnerable to various TCP and DoS attacks. In addition, applications that are designed
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to use TLS must have the mechanism integrated into the actual system design whereas 
it is possible to provide the required security feature as an add-on to the already existing 
system through the use of HIP [1].
Another major challenge on traditional Internet architecture that the HIP solution
tends to address is DoS attacks, a popular example is the TCP SYN attack. The routing
of packets on TCP involves the initiator sending SYN packets to the recipient and the
recipient replies with an acknowledgement packet SYN-ACK before allocating a TCP
control block structure for the communication session. After the allocation of control
block, there’s no further way for the recipient to verify that subsequent packets are
coming from the same host as contained in the SYN source address, hence creating
a loophole that allows for uncontrolled flooding of SYN request from few initiators
to a host in a proportion that inundates the host due to lack or memory and resources
to accommodate such overwhelming demand. Using HIP however, such an attack is
much more difficult to carry out, given that in HIP, the initiators identity is directly
connected to the SYN packets.
Using existing IP based internet architecture, it is relatively easy for an attacker to 
spoof the source IP address of a packet once the host is placed under DoS attack, in 
addition to spoofing the IP address of the host, such attacker can further block the 
service of the legitimate host on the network. In [40], authors proposed a system 
where source addresses are validated using HIP deployed in a first-hop router. After 
normal HIP base exchange, the first-hop router is able to register the source IP 
address of the host to a database provided there is no previous record of such address 
in the database, that way an attempt to register an already existing IP address can be 
interpreted as a spoofing attempt, hence such packet is dropped. This basic idea of 
storing the mapping between identity and source IP address allows for tracking of 
duplicates and spoofed IP addresses [40].
4.4 HIP-enabled Virtual Private LAN Services (HIPLS)
HIP-enabled Virtual Private LAN Services (HIPLS) was the first p roposed secure 
VPLS architecture. HIP adds a cryptographic name space to name internet host and 
provides a HIP-enabled virtual private LAN service over an untrusted network [11, 
30]. In spite of the perceived benefits of HIPLS in securing communication channels, 
it is still faced with a key limitation; lack of scalability in control, forwarding, and 
security planes, making HIPLS suitable only on unicast-only IPLS networks [30].
Typical VPNs are used to separate multiple LAN broadcast domains across shared 
network infrastructures. This section discusses how HIP can be used to create a VPLS 
overlay on standard IPv6 and IPv4 networks. In this case, Encapsulating Security 
Payload (ESP) tunnels are used to secure the tunnels between PEs, which are then 
managed using HIP signaling protocol. As shown in Figure 11, these HIP-enabled 
ESP tunnels constitute the pseudowires used to connect the VPLS forwarders. To 
accomplish this, each PE device is assigned a cryptographic HI and using certificates 
or parameters each HI is bound to other identifiers in the s ystem. HIP is then used to 
allow PE devices to authenticate one another and build secure tunnels over a public 
network. These PE devices may have to maintain Access Control Lists (ACLs) that 
they use to decide how the CEs talk to each other [11].
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Figure 11. PE reference model.
In [10, 9, 15], authors proposed two customized versions of HIP, one is based on
the use of session key and is called Session key based HIP VPLS architecture (S-
HIPLS), the other is a HIP-based hierarchical VPLS architecture H-HIPLS. S-HIPLS
mainly addresses the HIP limitations related to forwarding and security plane scala-
bility, however is unable to address the control plane scalability issues. H-HIPLS on
the other hand offers advanced security features on VPLS architecture such as authen-
tication, confidentiality, integrity, availability, secure control protocol and robustness
to the known attacks. The following subsections discuss more details of this proposed
HIP modifications, their benefits as well as their limitations.
4.4.1 Session key based HIP VPLS (S-HIPLS)
The main idea of the proposed Session key based HIP VPLS architecture is to use a 
new session key mechanism together with a customized version of HIP. Two types of 
keys are used in this case; the Content Encryption Key (CEK) which is a symmetric 
key used to encrypt and decrypt all messages in a single VPN and the Key Encryption 
Key (KEK) which is uniquely assigned to each PE and is used to encrypt and decrypt 
corresponding CEKs. All keys are managed and distributed by the Key Distribution 
Center (KDC) which also serves as the Authentication Server (AS) and maintains the 
ACLs of the VPN [15, 9].
S-HIPLS architecture is categorized into four subsections, i.e. PE registration and
deletion, data communication, control protocol, and key management. During PE reg-
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istration, a potential PE sends a request to the KDC to seek access to the VPN. This 
implies that such PE requires an initial tunnel with the KDC after which a HIP base 
exchange (HIP BEX) process is initiated, the BEX in this scenario is similar to the 
traditional HIP BEX [13], except that at the fourth stage of the exchange, a certificate 
containing the name of the authorized VPN, QoS policies, e.t.c is sent in the R2 mes-
sage if the user is a legitimate user. This authentication process is based on public 
key infrastructure, and when successfully completed, the PE is granted access to var-
ious network resources based on its category in the VPN ACL. On the revere end, it 
is also important to systematically remove inactive PEs from the VPN for security and 
resource optimization purposes. Inactivity notification m ay b e  p assive o r  a c tive de-
pending on the initial configurations. For active notification, the PE informs inactivity 
by itself while for passive notification, inactivity is confirmed when PE fails to respond 
to periodic CSK from the KDC [9].
For data communication stage, the S-HIPLS architecture establishes HIP tunnels
between PEs using IPsec. To avoid eavesdropping, all transmitted frames are encrypted
using the corresponding CEK and wrapped within ESP payload before sending to a
target PE.
At the control protocol, HIP tunnel is established between two intending users 
through a modified H IP B EX a uthentication p rocess. For t his s cenario, t here i s no 
D-H key exchange as in the traditional HIP BEX, this is because data is already en-
crypted using CSK, hence allowing for less processing time than in traditional HIP 
BEX. Address learning is also implemented at the control protocol, given that VPLS 
operates on the data link layer, PEs must learn the MAC addresses of the remote CEs 
and the network addresses of the corresponding PEs. The third operation of the control 
protocol is key distribution, this is a crucial operation because erroneously issuing a 
key to an unauthorized PE could derail the overall security of the VPN, hence the need 
for an adequate key management procedure. This procedure includes the distributions 
of both KEK and CEK. During KEK distribution, PEs share a unique symmetric key 
with the KDC which is then used as the KEK for that PE, while for CEK distribution, 
the KDC sends CEKs to each PE [15].
Based on the simulation outcome in [15], S-HIPLS shows some remarkable benefits
over traditional HIPLS architecture, such benefits include added scalability at the se-
curity plane. A key factor to this effect is reduction in the number of keys stored at the
PE, unlike in HIPLS scheme where an increase in the number of keys stored is linear
with respect to the number of PEs, S-HIPLS architecture ensures a constant number
of keys at PEs without recourse to increase in number of PEs. At the KDC, the incre-
ment in number of keys stored in both HIPLS and S-HIPLS is linear with respect to
the number of PEs, however, the S-HIPLS architecture tends to store slightly higher
number of keys than HIPLS, this owes to the fact that the number of keys stored by
S-HIPLS depends on both the number of PEs and VPNs whereas in HIPLS, this num-
ber is only based on the number of PEs. Summing up, the total number of keys stored
in the network for the S-HIPLS scheme is substantially reduced compared with that in
HIPLS.
On the forwarding plane, scalability is mainly dependent on the number of encryp-
tion per broadcast frame at the entry PE of the public network. Based on this fact,
the HIPLS scheme shows a linear increase in the number of encryption per broadcast
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frame at a PE, while for S-HIPLS, this number remains constant with the value 1 which
is a significant reduction in the number of encryptions per broadcast frame at the PE.
4.4.2 H-HIPLS
In [10], authors propose a HIP-based hierarchical VPLS architecture called Hierarchi-
cal HIPLS (H-HIPLS), the aim is to provide added security functionalities for tradi-
tional VPLS architecture. Such features as authentication, confidentiality, integrity,
secure control protocol, and robustness to known attacks. In addition, this architecture
promises to enhance scalability on both control and forwarding planes. On the secu-
rity plane, this architecture offers the same level of scalability as in other flat VPLS
architectures. These flat architectures are faced with a number of limitations including
poor scalability potential due to the need to use an individual pseudowire for every pair
of PE i.e. N-square scalability. They also suffer from high signaling overhead, lim-
ited number of possible hardware ingress replications as well as complex forwarding
procedure.
In an attempt to resolve these issues, H-VPLS was proposed [7]. H-VPLS reduces 
the number of PEs connected in full mesh topology hence saving on the number of 
pseudowires required on the VPLS. It utilizes two types of PEs; user facing PE (u-PE) 
and network facing PE (n-PE). n-PE houses all the intelligence of the VPLS i.e. packet 
forwarding, address learning, and auto discovery functions while u-PE manages the 
forwarding of all packets to connected n-PE. Cost effectiveness is another advantage 
of the H-VPLS architecture when it comes to network expansion, this architecture 
allows the use of simple and cheap equipment to be used as u-PE. In addition, H-VPLS 
is a preferred option for use in heterogeneous service provider networks because the 
technology of its constituent layers is independent of each other [10].
On the down side, H-VPLS architectures suffer substantial amount of security threats
such as DoS attack, TCP reset attack, and spoofing attacks. To avert these threats, en-
cryption is used on both the control and data traffic of VPLS. Without such encryption,
eavesdroppers could retrieve or alter the content of the transmitted data. Avoiding such
threats also requires that the privacy of both the PE and CE is protected and that the
PE is able to handle broadcast traffic.
H-HIPLS is a H-VPLS architecture that harnesses the security features of HIP to
provide a secure connection across a VPN. H-HIPLS is basically a modification to
the HIP-based session key mechanism which is proposed in the S-HIPLS architecture
discussed in the previous Section. The goal is to facilitate hierarchical architecture,
support encrypted label based forwarding and dynamic address learning mechanisms.
As proposed in [10], H-HIPLS operates based on five key mechanisms; control pro-
tocol, key management, PE management, packet forwarding, and address learning. On
the control protocol, tunnels are securely established and frames encrypted using the
session key of the VPN. Key management is done for both CEK and KEK, the KDC
distributes CEKs and maintains ACLs for the entire VPN. PE management mechanism
ensures that new PEs are duly authenticated, in this case using a HIP-based authenti-
cation mechanism. First the PE establishes a tunnel with the KDC using HIP base
exchange which then establishes security associations for the tunnels and at the same
time performs mutual authentication for the end nodes using their cryptographic iden-
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tities. The proposed H-HIPLS advances this authentication process by incorporating
the use of ACLs in authorizing new users. Hence after the identity verification at the
third stage of the HIP BEX, the ACL is checked to verify the category of the new user
before granting access to the VPN. In addition, the tunnel establishment for this ar-
chitecture does not incorporate the D-H key exchange process as with traditional HIP
BEX, hence the R1 and l2 messages do not contain any fields for D-H message instead
authentication tokens provided by the KDC are used.
After PE authentication, packets are forwarded using an encrypted label mechanism,
these label is inserted into the ESP header at the third step of the base exchange before
forwarding the frame to the n-PE. On receiving the data frame, the u-PE first removes
the header and decrypts the ESP payload using the corresponding VPN session key.
The n-PE then decrypts the label and checks the nest hop for the data frame from the
MAC-PE mapping table.
Address learning is normally important in VPLS given that it is a layer 2 VPN solu-
tion and relies on the use of MAC addresses for frame forwarding. Since the underlay
provider network is a layer 3 network, H-HIPLS architecture proposes the use of dy-
namic MAC-PE mapping to map the MAC address of the CE to the corresponding
network address of the PE. Using both u-PE advertisement and dynamic address re-
quest, each n-PE is able to update its MAC-PE mapping. Details of these two address
learning instances are contained in [10].
Based on the simulated outcome in [10], the proposed H-HIPLS architecture has 
strong potential to enhance scalability and promote security on VPLS networks. For in-
stance, the architecture significantly reduces the number of tunnels required to achieve 
control plane scalability. For security plane scalability, the key storage complexity of 
H-HIPLS at the PE is substantially optimized. At the PE, the architecture maintains a 
constant number of keys, similar to the S-HIPLS architecture and unlike the traditional 
HIPLS which maintains a linear increment in the number of keys stored and the num-
ber of PEs. At the KDC, the total number of keys stored for H-HIPLS architecture is on 
a linear increase, similar to HIPLS and S-HIPLS architectures, however the H-HIPLS 
and S-HIPLS have a slightly higher number of keys stored compared to HIPLS. On 
the overall, authors [10] argue that the number of keys stored on the network using 
the proposed H-HIPLS architecture is on a linear increase while for traditional HIPLS 
ar-chitecture, the number of keys stored is on an exponential increase at a relatively 
the same level of performance.
On security, the proposed H-HIPLS architecture also shows substantial resistance
to attacks on the control plane. Going by the simulation outcome in [10], H-HIPLS
shows no packet drop during a TCP SYN DoS attack session. For TCP reset attack,
the outcome also shows that H-HIPLS is absolutely resistant to TCP reset attacks.
4.4.3 Comparing Different VPLS Architectures
Table 4.1 below presents a tabulated comparison of the different VPLS architectures 
[10, 9, 30, 15]. These architectures are compared based on various performance 
matrices to enable stakeholders make more informed decisions on what architecture 
most fits their intended VPLS solution.
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Table 4.1. Comparing different VPLS architectures
LDP based
H-VPLS
BGP based
H-VPLS HIPLS S-HIPLS H-HIPLS
Architecture Hierarchical Hierarchical Flat Flat Hierarchical
Scalability of forwarding
plane High High Low High High
Scalability of security
plane - - Low High High
Scalability of control
plane High High Low Low High
Protected control protocol No No Yes Yes Yes
Data traffic encryption No No Yes Yes Yes
IP attack protection No No Yes Yes Yes
Efficiency of the
broadcast mechanism High High Low High High
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5. Testbed Implementation and Result Analysis
Two separate testbeds were implemented, one for the Linux-based open-source HIP
implementations and another for the two sets of security appliances from different ven-
dors, one secured using the HIP protocol and the other non-secure system was equally
evaluated. In all cases, these solutions are compared against a non-secure connec-
tion for network performance in terms of overhead bandwidth utilization, latency, and
jitters.
5.1 Linux-based Open Source HIP Implementations
The two open-source Linux-based HIP implementations under study (HIPL and Open-
HIP) were tested across three different network scenarios. First on a wired LAN, then 
on Wireless LAN (WLAN), and finally on a  public network (Campus network con-
nected to the Internet). The experiment testbed consists of two User Equipments (UE), 
i.e. Two laptops with Ubuntu 12.04 LTS (Long Term Support) operating system. We 
installed HIPL and later OpenHIP on both machines; one plays the initiators role and 
the other, the responder role. For OpenHIP implementation, we installed the Open-
HIP binary (version 0.9.1) from the OpenHIP online repository [6], while for HIPL 
implementation, we installed HIP daemon (hipl-daemon) version 1.0.8 from the In-
fraHIP project repository [5] along with the DNS proxy (hipl-dnsproxy), and 
firewall (hipl-firewall) on both UEs. All installed packages are the most up-to-date 
versions and contain the latest codes developed.
The first experiment set-up consists of two HIP-enable UEs linked on a Local Area 
Network (LAN). The LAN network is established by connecting each UE to a Giga-
bit Ethernet bridge – Cisco Linksys WUMC710, which is further linked to a unified 
service router – D-link DSR-250N as shown in Figure 12.
Figure 12. LAN set-up.
In the second test scenario, we set up a WLAN using the same UEs as in the first 
set-up, here each UE is connected to a D-link DSR-250N unified service router. These 
routers are further linked wirelessly through a Wireless Distribution System (WDS) 
service. This set-up represents a minimal case of an ideal WLAN in a typical enterprise 
network environment as shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. WLAN set-up.
The third scenario is set-up on the campus Wide Area Network (WAN), the two UEs 
are connected to two Cisco Linksys WUMC710 Gigabit Ethernet bridges [40] 
which are further linked to the campus network on Ethernet, supporting both IPv4 
and IPv6 connectivity and a maximum speed of 1GBps. This test scenario which is 
illustrated in Figure 14 represents a typical case of running HIP over a public shared 
and insecure network.
Figure 14. WAN (campus network) set-up.
For each scenario, we first test the performance of the network without any HIP
implementations, then establish HIP connection between the two UEs using HIPL and
later OpenHIP. For each set-up, we analyze the performance penalty of security due
to HIP implementations, performance is measured in terms of throughput, jitter, and
latency. We measure the performance against the non-secure scenario. The throughput
and latency are measured using the IPERF networking tool [41] while jitter is measured
using the basic ping tool.
5.1.1 OpenHIP Implementation
The OpenHIP project aims at developing the reference implementation of HIP for var-
ious platforms. OpenHIP is a free open-source HIP implementation developed within 
the IETF and the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). It was licensed by MIT/Expat to
provide researchers an experimental platform to study HIP and other related protocols [6].
In this setup, OpenHIP uses HIP to provide the rapid exchange of host identities 
between PC-1 and PC-2 and at the same time establishes a pair IPsec Security As-
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sociations (SA) to be used with IPsec Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP), hence
OpenHIP is able to provide the various security benefits accruable to HIP such as re-
sistance to DoS and man-in-the-middle attacks and protecting the upper layer protocols
(TCP and UDP) from such attacks.
With OpenHIP installed on both UEs, a hitgen command is used to automatically
generate the Host Identity Tags (HIT) for both UE-1 and UE-2. It is important to
disable the Domain Name System (DNS) when setting up the hip configuration file.
This is necessary because it enables HIP to connect the hosts to the network using the
HIT tags and not allowing the DNS to view them as domain names and attempt to
translate them into corresponding IP addresses as per directory services.
Next is to configure "my_host_identity" and the "known_host_identities" files 
in both UEs. As emphasized in [4], actual Host Identities are never used directly 
in any Internet protocols, instead a Host Identity Tags (HITs) or a Local Scope 
Identifiers (LSIs) are used. The corresponding Host Identifier public key may be 
stored in vari-ous DNS or Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) 
directories, and they are passed in the HIP base exchange.
For our case, an LSI is used to represent the Host Identity, the parameter in the LSI
is the actual IP address of the host. The known_host_identies file contains a list of the
names, IP addresses, Host Identity Tags (HITs) and LSIs of all hosts that are associated
with a given host.
With the above configurations, the HIP daemon is run in verbose mode using the
sudo hip -v command. On successful execution, a HIP interface named hip0 is added
to the list of network interfaces displayed by the ifconfig command, hence the HIP tun-
nel is active and ready for use. Another important parameter to check for at this stage
is the value of the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU), this is an octet representation
of the largest size of packet that can be sent over a packet based network like the in-
ternet. As noted in [2], the size of MTU could very much depend on the network path,
hence different network paths tend to have different MTU sizes. It is the role of trans-
port protocols such as TCP to discover the ideal size of MTU on the initial stage of
a connection. The default MTU size for OpenHIP is 1400, however this size is inef-
ficient for the transmission and from experiment OpenHIP is unable to automatically
decide the adequate MTU size, hence the need to manually reset the MTU to a larger
size. For the purpose of this experiment, the MTU size is set to 1500. With the hip
daemon running, the tunnel performance is evaluated using ping and iperf tools.
5.1.2 HIPL Implementation
HIPL is an open-source software developed by InfraHIP project team, the focus is to
develop the missing infrastructure pieces such as DNS, NAT, and firewall support in
order to enable a widespread deployment of HIP [5]. As a HIP based project, HIPL
aims at securely supporting mobility and multi-homing on the TCP/IP stack, hence
providing advanced security and privacy as well as other advanced network concepts
such as mobile ad hoc and moving networks.
HIPL offers infrastructural support for the application related aspects of HIP. These
include APIs, OS security, rendezvous service, multiple end-points within a single
host, process migrations, and other issues related to enterprise-level solutions.
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In this set-up, a hipl-daemon package is installed and configured on both the server
and client PCs. Both PCs are running 32-bit Ubuntu 12.04 LTS (Long Term Support)
operating system. Other optional but useful packages (hipl-dnsproxy and hipl-firewall)
were installed alongside hipl. After installation, a hipsd # command is used to run the
hipl daemon. When hipl daemon is active, two additional interfaces labeled dummy0
and dummy0:2 are displayed among the network interfaces for both UEs.
For this experiment, we use IPv6 to establish HIP tunnel between the two hosts. It is
important here to mention that both IPv4 and IPv6 are equally supported and can inter
operate. The IPv6 address to be used for the HIP tunnel could be added to the LAN
interface or to the WLAN interface using a similar approach. In this case, the WLAN
interface was used, and the host file of the UE acting as the connection initiator was
configured with the HIT and IP address of the pair UE.
Using nc6 as the test application, a HIP connection is established between the two
hosts. The HIP daemon uses automatically generated host identities from /etc/hip
folder. A confirmatory test of the establishment of HIP tunnel is to type in some
random texts on either UE and hit the enter key to display them on the pair UE. With
this confirmation, the performance of the tunnel is accessed using the ping and iperf
tools as previously done with the OpenHIP application.
Table 5.1 contains the simulation settings for IPERF testing tool, these settings are
also maintained for the enterprise solution testbed. Both long and short sessions were
tested, for Linux-based Open Source HIP Implementations, a short session runs for 10
seconds while the long session runs for 200 seconds, each experiment is repeated 50
times in both directions.
Table 5.1. The Simulation Settings for IPERF
Parameter Value Value
Protocol TCP UDP
Port 5001 5001
Buffer size 1470KBytes 1470KBytes
Packet size 1500Bytes 1500Bytes
TCP window size - 85.3KBytes
Report interval 1s 1s
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5.2 Analysis of Results for Linux-based Open Source HIP Implementations
5.2.1 Performance penalty of security on latency
For all three scenarios, we measured the performance penalty of the two open-source
HIP implementations on latency. Latency was measured using the basic ping test and
recording the Round Trip Time (RTT) over 100 test packets transmitted in both direc-
tions. Each approach was compared against the non-secure connection.
Figure 15. Performance penalty on latency.
Based on the experiment outcome shown in Figure 15, for the LAN scenario, Open-
HIP implementation causes about 3 times more latency compared with the non-secure 
and 2 times more than HIPL implementation. The HIPL implementation increases 
latency by approximately 50% compared with the non-secure architecture. For the 
WLAN scenario, OpenHIP implementation increases latency by approximately 23%
while OpenHIP increases by about 35% compared with the non-secure scenario. In 
the WAN set-up, HIPL increases latency approximately by 28% while OpenHIP in-
creases by about 13% compared with the non-secure scenario. This increase in latency 
for both HIP implementations is due to the additional reverse lookup involved in HIP 
base exchange in addition to the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) query performed 
upon the first connection.
5.2.2 Performance Penalty of Security on Throughput
We measured the performance penalty of the two HIP implementations on both TCP
and UDP throughputs and compared with the non-secure connection. Each of the
three scenarios was measured and evaluated independently. Both long and short ses-
sions were measured as described in the experiment set-up and in all cases results are
compared with the non-secure scenario.
The following subsections provide numerical analyses of the experiment outcome 
for the two HIP implementations and compares them to the non-secure scenario. 
The analyses show the performance penalty in terms of latency, throughput and 
jitter for the three tested network scenarios. 
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For LAN Scenario
As shown in Figures 16 and 17, HIPL implementation performs nearly as good as the 
non-secure connection in terms of throughput, with a penalty of about 3% for both 
long and short TCP and UDP sessions, reaching approximately 820 Mbps for TCP and 
about 850 Mbps for UDP. OpenHIP however has its peak throughput at approximately 
100 Mbps for both long and short TCP sessions, this is because OpenHIp is imple-
mented at user-level in all three scenarios, and by design limitation, its throughput 
peaks at 100 Mbps [42].
Figure 16. Average TCP throughput for LAN set-up.
On WLAN
Figures 18 and 19 show the results for the WLAN configuration, the performance 
penalty of security on throughput for HIPL implementation is approximately 32% for 
the long session and about 30% for the short session for both TCP and UDP. For this 
set-up OpenHIP had an average TCP throughput of about 13 Mbps and for both long 
and short sessions while the UDP throughput reaches an average of 14 Mbps for both 
long and short sessions. It is important to mention that in addition to the encryption 
implemented by HIP, the WLAN Access Points also introduces an additional layer of 
encryption for data using the WiFi Protected Access (WPA) protocol, hence causing 
more reduction in throughput.
On WAN (campus network)
The WAN set-up showed remarkable variations in the performance for both HIP imple-
mentations, while this could have been due to some network variables such as network
density, averaging over several tests showed that both HIP implementations almost had
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Figure 17. Average UDP throughput for LAN set-up.
Figure 18. Average TCP throughput for WLAN set-up.
equal performance for both TCP and UDP throughput, however this is at a penalty of 
about 22% compared with the none-secure scenarios as shown in Figures 20 and 21.
5.2.3 Performance Penalty of Security on Jitter
In all three set-ups, we measure the performance penalty of security on UDP jitter 
using the IPERF tool. Figures 22, 23 and 24 illustrate the experiment results.
According to the experiment results, the average jitter on OpenHIP implementation
is about 20% higher than HIPL and 75% higher than non-secure connection for the
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Figure 19. Average UDP throughput for WLAN set-up.
Figure 20. Average TCP throughput for WAN (campus network) 
set-up.
LAN scenario. On WLAN, OpenHIP experiences about 52% more jitter than none-
secure connection and about 44% more than HIPL for the long sessions, while for
the short sessions, OpenHIP experiences about 78% more jitter than the non-secure
connection and about 52% more than HIPL. On WAN, OpenHIP experiences about
48% more jitter than the non-secure and 37% more than HIPL implementation for
both long and short UDP sessions.
It is important to mention that the increased jitter for both HIP implementations does
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Figure 21. Average UDP throughput for WAN (campus 
network) set-up.
Figure 22. Average Jitter for LAN set-up.
not result from the security feature of HIP, rather it is a combined result of queuing,
contention, timing drift, and serialization effects on the path through the network. For
HIPL implementation, the additional hipl-firewall utility that accompanies the hipl-
daemon is also a contributing factor for the increased jitter.
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Figure 23. Average Jitter for WLAN set-up.
Figure 24. Average Jitter for WAN (campus network) set-up.
5.3 Enterprise-based Network Security Solution
Tempered NetworksTM provides a centrally managed security solution that leverages 
on existing network infrastructure and facilitates the provisioning and management 
of secure, private overlay networks over any existing network. The solution con-
sists of two tightly integrated components namely, the HIPswitch ConductorTM with 
SimpleConnectTM User Interface and the HIPswitchTM security appliances. These two 
are interconnected with other network equipment as shown in Figure 25 [43]. 
41
The technical specifications of the actual components used in the experiment is 
contained in Appendix 1.
Figure 25. Tempered Networks Solution connectivity, taken 
from [43].
The HIPswitch conductor is the control center of the Tempered Networks solution. 
Through the SimpleConnect user interface, the HIPswitch conductor is able to coor-
dinate the configuration, security p olicies, and t rust relationships of all HIPswitches 
connected to the network. The conductor creates a secure private overlay network with 
HIPswitches and delegates management of each private network to authorized users. 
Other functions include defining the protected devices behind each HIPswitch, config-
uring communication security policies, audit and monitoring of the private networks, 
HIPswitches and devices [43].
In addition to security, the Tempered Networks solution also provides High Avail-
ability (HA) functionality on HIPswitch-300. To implement this feature, a pair of 
HIPswitch-300 are connected in a high availability mode through a dedicated Ether-
net link and configured on the SimpleConnect UI to offer hardware redundancy for the 
secure connections. Using the HA configuration, the pair ISAs are assigned as Pri-
mary and Secondary as shown in Figure 26. Both SAs maintain a heartbeat through 
the Ethernet link. A failure in power or connection on the Primary HA automatically 
transfers the private network communications from the Primary SA to the Secondary 
SA [43].
For this experiment, we model a VPLS using the above described Tempered Net-
works solutions on the existing WiFi network. Layer 2 legacy devices are intercon-
nected via the VPLS network. Here, the existing Wi-Fi network is provisioning as the
provider network of VPLS.
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Figure 26. SimpleConnect Dashboard.
The experiment testbed consists of two User Equipments (UEs) which are placed 
in two different locations. Two laptops with Ubuntu 12.04 LTS (Long Term Support) 
operating system are used as two UEs. We use a wireless network as the provider 
network. It is a WiFi 802.11g standard wireless network which supports a maximum 
speed of 54 Mpbs. Figure 27 illustrates the experiment testbed.
Figure 27. Experiment testbed for SCADA network.
Two HIP enabled PEs are used at the edge of the Wi-Fi network. PE-1 has the
wireless connectivity to the campus network. A wired shared network is established
by using a WiFi router with four Ethernet ports. PE-2 is wired connected to the WiFi
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router via an Ethernet port. Two HIPswitches (HIPswitch-300) shown in Figure 28 
are used as PE devices. These HIPswitches are developed by Tempered Networks 
(formerly Asguard) [43]. Each HIP enabled network appliance called PE uses a 
unique public/private RSA 2048 bit key pair as its HI.
Figure 28. Experiment testbed for Tempered Network Solution.
Furthermore, a HIP enabled network management server is attached to the shared
wired network. This server is responsible for the VPLS provisioning functions. It
is used to assign network addresses to PEs, key management, VPN tunnel manage-
ment and distribution of cryptographic credentials. Also, it supports the auto discovery
functions of PEs. All customer data traffic is encrypted before transporting them over
the provider network. HIP uses Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) - Cipher-block
chaining (CBC) encryption. The key size of AES is 128 bits in this experiment.
To the best of our knowledge, HIP based VPLS architectures are the only secure
VPLS architectures proposed yet. None of the other VPLS architectures have any
dedicated security features. Thus, it is not possible to study the security penalty of
other architectures. We analyze only the HIPLS architecture in our experiments. Both
S-HIPLS and H-HIPLS architectures are proposed only to tackle the scalability issues
by proposing a key distribution and tunnel establishment mechanisms. These changes
impact only the operation of the control plane. In the steady state operation (once the
VPLS network is established), both S-HIPLS and H-HIPLS architectures have exactly
the same behavior as the original HIPLS. All three architectures use HIP tunnels to
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secure the data plane traffic. Thus, we present the experiment results based on original
HIPLS architecture only. However, other secure VPLS architectures such as S-HIPLS
and H-HIPLS also have the same behavior in this experiment setup.
In this experiment, we analyze the performance penalty of security due to secure
VPLS architectures on throughput, jitter and latency. We measure the performance
against no VPLS scenario and with non secure VPLS (LDP VPLS) scenario. The
throughput and latency are measured by using the IPERF networking tool [41]. Ta-
ble 5.1 contains the simulation settings for IPERF testing tool.
5.4 Analysis of Results for Enterprise-based Network Security Solution
In this section, the enterprise-based network security solution is evaluated for overhead
bandwidth utilization, latency, and jitter. Two sets of enterprise equipment (Tempered
Networks and Byres Security) are compared with a non-secure connection based on the
listed parameters. For the TEB experiment, the same experiment set-up as in Tempered
Network solution was used. For each experiment, we replace PEs in the testbed with
TEBs and HIPswitches. We use two types of HIPswitches namely HIPswitch-200 and
HIPswitch-300. A UDP session with the bandwidth of 54Mbps is used in each case.
5.4.1 Performance Penalty of Security on Latency
In the first set of experiments, we measure the performance penalty of security on
latency due to the secure VPLS architecture. The Round Trip Time (RTT) of a packet
is measured by using the basic ping test. Each experiment is run for 100 packets in
both directions.
Figure 29. The performance penalty of security on latency.
Figure 29 contains the actual and average latency for secure VPLS solution com-
pared with the non-secure connection. Latency is measured based on average RTT
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values. The experiment results show that the secure VPLS architecture for the en-
terprise equipment increases the latency approximately by 87% than the non VPLS
scenario and by 68% than the non secure VPLS scenario. Similarly, non secure VPLS
increases the latency approximately by 11% than the non VPLS scenario. The main
reason to increase the latency is the delay in both the packet encryption and tunnel
encapsulation leading to extended packet data path.
5.4.2 Performance Penalty of Security on Throughput
In the second set of experiments, we measured the performance penalty of security on
throughput. Both TCP and UDP sessions were considered.
1. Performance Penalty of Security on TCP Throughput
First, we considered TCP sessions. The throughput was measured by using the
IPERF networking tool. We measured the throughput of both short and long
TCP sessions. A short TCP session runs for 10 seconds and a long TCP session
runs for 500 seconds. Each experiment was repeated 50 times in both directions.
According to experiment results shown in Figure 30, the performance penalty
of security on throughput is about 19% for the short TCP session and 21% for
the long TCP session compared with the non VPLS scenario. Moreover, the
performance penalty of security on throughput is about 18% for a short TCP
session and 20% for a long TCP session compared with the non secure VPLS
architecture. Thus, we conclude that the performance penalty of security on
throughput is independent of the duration of a TCP session.
On the other hand, non secure VPLS reduces the throughput only by 1% than the
non VPLS scenario in both short and long TCP sessions. Therefore, the impact
of VPLS tunnel encapsulation on TCP throughput is very low. The additional
layer of encryption is the main reasons for the reduced average throughput of the
secure VPLS architecture.
2. Performance Penalty of Security on UDP Throughput
In the next experiment, we consider UDP sessions. The throughput is measured
by using the IPERF networking tool. The UDP bandwidth of IPERF is set to 54
Mbps which is equal to the bandwidth of the network. In this experiment also,
we measure the throughput for both short and long UDP sessions. A short UDP
session runs for 10 seconds and long UDP session runs for 500 seconds. Each
experiment repeated 50 times in both directions.
According to the experiment results shown in Figure 31, the performance
penalty of security on throughput is about 20% for a short UDP session and
21% for a long UDP session compared with the non-VPLS scenario. Moreover,
the performance penalty of security on throughput is about 19% for both for
short and long UDP sessions compared with the non secure VPLS architecture.
Thus, we conclude that for this scenario, the performance penalty of security on
throughput is independent of the duration of a UDP session.
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(a) Short TCP session.
(b) Long TCP session.
Figure 30. The performance penalty of security on TCP 
throughput.
On the other hand, the non-secure VPLS latency increment is below 2% com-
pared with the non VPLS scenario in both short and long TCP sessions. There-
fore, the impact of VPLS tunnel encapsulation on TCP throughput is very low.
Similar to the TCP experiment, the additional layer of encryption is the main
reason for the reduce average throughput of the secure VPLS architecture.
Furthermore, the experiment results reveal that UDP throughput is 14% higher
for both short and long sessions than TCP throughput for secure VPLS architec-
ture. Similarly, UDP throughput is 15% higher for short sessions and 14% higher
for long sessions than TCP throughput for both non secure VPLS and non VPLS
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(a) Short UDP session.
(b) Long UDP session.
Figure 31. The performance penalty of security on UDP 
throughput.
architectures. Moreover, the performance penalty of security on throughput is
around 20% for both UDP and TCP sessions compared with both non VPLS
scenario and non secure VPLS architecture. Thus, we can conclude that the per-
formance penalty of security on throughput is independent of the transport layer
protocol.
Wijesinha et al. observed that the maximum achievable UDP throughput is well
below 50% (less than 27 Mbps) for 802.11g Wi-Fi connection at the maximum
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data rate of 54 Mbps even under ideal and controlled conditions [44]. In our
experiments, the UDP throughput (26.5 Mbps) is almost similar to these findings
and it verified the accuracy of our test bed.
5.4.3 Performance Penalty of Security on Jitter
In the third set of experiments, we measure the performance penalty of security 
on the jitter. The jitter of a UDP session is measured by using the IPERF net-
working tool. Each experiment repeated 50 times in both directions. Figures 
32 and 33 illustrate the experiment results. The UDP bandwidth of IPERF is set 
to 54 Mbps.
Figure 32. The performance penalty of security on jitter for 
short UDP session.
According to the experiment results shown in Figures 32 and 33, the average 
jitter of the secure VPLS architecture is about two times higher than the non-
VPLS and non-secure scenarios for both short and long sessions. Thus, we 
conclude that the performance penalty of security on jitter is independent of the 
duration of the session for all scenarios. However, for the SCADA scenario, the 
average jitter of secure VPLS is still less than 0.5 ms. Thus, the performance 
penalty of security on jitter in this scenario will not affect the real time applica-
tion such as VoIP video streaming in a short range network.
5.4.4 Other Comparisons
The average throughput, jitter and latency are compared based on the outcome 
of the experiments. The HIPswitch-300 devices have better performance than 
TEBs in all three performance metrics. HIPswitch-300 devices reduce the la-
tency by 35% as shown in Figure 36 reduce jitter by 83% as shown in Fig-
ure 35, and increase the throughput by 8 times than TEB devices as shown
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Figure 33. The performance penalty of security on jitter for 
long UDP session.
in Figure 34. Moreover, HIPswitch-200 devices reduce the latency by 13%
and jitter by 46% and increase the throughput by 2 times than TEB devices. 
HIPswitch-300 devices have higher processing capabilities than TEBs, this is the 
main reason for the improved performance of VPLS networks using HIPswitch- 
300 devices. This result, therefore, opens up new opportunities for research. 
According to a recent Intel’s white paper, IPsec acceleration is possible by using 
external accelerators and/or using new AES instruction sets for processors [45]. 
Thus, the adaptation of these techniques will further improve the performance of 
secure VPLS products.
Figure 34. Average throughput comparison for VPLS network.
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Figure 35. Average jitter comparison for VPLS network.
Figure 36. Average latency comparison for VPLS network.
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6. Discussion and Future Works
HIP is becoming popular among many industrial applications. The HIP Working
Group (HIP-WG) has published several interoperating implementations of HIP, most
of which are open source. These applications spread from mobile applications to large
scale cloud systems. Most of these specifications have been published as experimental
RFCs, because the effects of the protocol on applications and on the Internet as a whole
were unknown. Such experimental RFCs produced by the HIP WG allowed the com-
munity to experiment with HIP technologies and learn from these experiments. The
HIP WG will now produce standards track versions of the main HIP RFCs taking as a
base the existing Experimental RFCs. The WG will also specify certificate handling in
HIP in a standards track RFC [46].
Earlier in April 2015, the IETF put up two Requests For Comments (RFC), RFC 
7401 [47] and RFC 7402 [48]. RFC 7401 specifies a second version of HIP – 
HIPv2 which is an improvement on the earlier version defined by RFC 5201 [49], it 
mainly sets to address the limitations of the previous version as well as the issues 
raised by In-ternet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) such as crypto agility, hence 
ensuring more robust authentication mechanism. RFC 7402 specifies an 
Encapsulating Security Pay-load (ESP) Transport Format for HIP. Initial HIP 
implementation uses ESP only for HIP base exchange i.e. when setting up a HIP 
association between two hosts, however RFC 7402 specifies the use of ESP for 
protecting user data traffic after the HIP base exchange for integrity and optimal 
encryption. In addition, RFC 7402 specifies a set of HIP protocol extensions and their 
handling. Using these extensions, a pair of ESP Se-curity Associations (SAs) is 
created between the hosts during the base exchange. The resulting ESP Security 
Associations use keys drawn from the keying material (KEY-MAT) generated 
during the base exchange [48]. Other added features to the HIPv2 includes the 
addition of host mobility support in HIP, the extension of Domain Name System 
(DNS) to contain Host Identity information, using a rendezvous mechanism to 
contact mobile HIP hosts. This specification is intended to be an integral part of 
the HIPv2 [47]. In the following subsections, the industrial use cases of existing HIP 
implementations are discussed.
6.1 OpenHIP Implementation
VPLS security solutions are regarded by industrial networks as cost effective, high 
speed and multipoint connectivity model. Henderson et al. proposed a HIP based 
VPLS (HIPLS) architecture to secure VPLS network. HIPLS architecture is imple-
mented by using OpenHIP implementation. HIPLS architecture is currently used in 
many industrial networks. Boeing, which is one of the largest airline manufactures in 
the world, is using HIPLS based VPLS network in the assembly line of Boeing 777 
airplanes [50]. General Electronics (GE) is working on OpenHIP based security solu-
tion to secure the inter-train communication [51]. Moreover, two of the major SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) network appliance developing companies 
have already started to develop HIPLS based security solutions based on OpenHIP im-
plementation. The first commercial product of OpenHIP implementation is released 
in 2009 by Canadian company Byres Security. They developed HIPLS based end-box
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product called Tofino Endboxes (TEBs) to establish secure VPLS network for SCADA 
and industrial process control systems [52]. In 2011, US based Asguard networks 
com-pany also released HIP enabled network appliances called Industrial Security 
Appli-ances (ISAs) based on HIPLS architecture by using OpenHIP implementation  
[53]. In 2013, Tempered Networks acquired Asguard Network and Tempered 
Networks is now offering a wide range of HIPLS based network appliances called 
HIPswitches [43]. In their second release, the HIPswitches are provided with a web 
based graphical user interface for the device configuration and maintenance via the 
HIP Conductor. Thus, the configuration process of HIPswitches is simple and user 
friendly. Moreover, HIP-switches 300 support inbuilt wireless connectivity as well as 
other utility functions like the High Availability (HA) feature. A more detailed 
documentation of the features of the Tempered Network HIP solution can be found in 
the appendix of this report.
6.2 HIPL Implementation
HIPL which started as a student project in 2001 was continued in 2002 at HIIT in 
Fuego-Core under InfraHIP and InfraHIP II projects. Efforts on implementation and 
interoperability with IndraNet, Ericsson, and Boeing provided substantial feedback tot 
he IETF drafts, hence the drive towards standardization by IETF. At initial stage HIPL 
was mainly kernelspace-oriented implementations. Not too long after, the HIPL imple-
mentation gradually moved from a research prototype towards an open source product. 
The first mobile implementation of HIP was developed based on HIPL implementa-
tion. In 2013, basic support for Android was included in the HIPL source code [5]. 
Many features were enabled in this mobile implementation over past two years. For 
instance, HIP based firewall functionality for Android has enabled in late 2014. HIPL 
implementation is also to secure cloud deployment in CERN. HIPL based security so-
lution is utilized in cloud deployment that is used for analyzing CMS (Compact Muon 
Solenoid) data from CERN [54]. HIPL implementation provides the secure 
connectiv-ity and connection management capabilities for OpenStack based cloud.
Earlier in 2012, HIPL released its latest version, release 1.0.7, with improved code
quality and prebuilt binaries for a number Linux distributions, namely Ubuntu, Fedora,
and CentOS [5]. Several other features have been integrated in this release, features
such as HIT or public-key based access control using HIP firewall, simple mobility
to replace the need for multihoming, LSI support, IPsec heartbeat support, HIT-to-IP
look up using DNS (domain specific), changing of ESP transform order, Public key
to HI record conversion, DNS proxy support (to intercept and inject LSIs and HITs to
apps) e.t.c [5].
6.3 Architectural Limitation of Secure VPLS Architectures
This section briefly presents the main architectural limitations in existing secure VPLS
architectures.
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6.3.1 Impact on L2 protocols
VPLS architectures allow the sharing of the same Ethernet broadcast domain over
multiple geographically distributed sites. Generally, the legacy user equipment use
various L2 network protocols such as STP (Spanning Tree Protocol), RARP Reverse
Address Resolution Protocol, ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) in this Ethernet net-
work. However, VPLS based inter-site connectivity links (VPN tunnels) are invisible
to L2 devices and L2 protocol. These hidden links have very different behaviors than
typical Ethernet links. Thus, many layer 2 protocols fail to function properly in VPLS
based Ethernet network. For instance, STP fails to identify the loops over the provider
network. It causes many issues such as broadcast storms, multiple frame transmissions,
higher spanning tree convergence time and forwarding table instability.
Secure VPLS architectures are still incapable of providing a concrete solution for
this issue. HIPLS proposed to evade the transmission of L2 PDUs (Protocol Data
Units) over VPLS network. However, it is not a perfect solution since many SCADA
and process control devices still rely on L2 protocols for their proper operation.
6.3.2 Static Tunnel Establishment and Maintenance Procedure
The existing secure VPLS architectures require to establish IPsec tunnels between PEs
in the VPLS network. Moreover, authors proposed to maintain these tunnels for a long
period to minimize the performance penalty due to the tunnel establishment procedure.
The tunnel maintenance duration is static and predefined by the network administra-
tors. However, some of the customer sites have very low traffic intensity between
them.
As a result, some of these tunnels will not be used very frequently. The maintenance
of a tunnel between such sites not only waste PE’s resources such as memory, CPU, and
ports but also occupy the network bandwidth for tunnel update messages. Therefore,
it is necessary to fine tune the tunnel maintenance duration based on traffic demand.
However, the existing secure VPLS architectures do not support dynamic parameter
adjustment for IPsec tunnels.
6.4 Future Works
A potential future work to this thesis would be to extend the experiments beyond
SCADA networks such as long-haul and telecommunication networks. For instance,
using the Internet to interconnect two sites which are located at far away locations,
possibly in different cities. Another possible extension could be an integration of HIP
into the SDN architecture to provide security on the channel and then evaluating the
effectiveness of such modification and the potential penalty on performance.
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7. SUMMARY
This thesis work evaluated the performance penalty of security on various HIP based
security solutions, using throughput, jitter, and latency as performance metrics. Two
main scenarios were evaluated; the open-source Linux-based HIP implementations
and the enterprise based solutions. Two separate instances of each scenario was imple-
mented. The open-source Linux-based solutions were provided by HIPL and OpenHIP
implementations, while the enterprise solutions were provided by Tempered Networks
and Byres Security enterprise equipment.
For the enterprise based solutions, the performance penalty of security on through-
put was around 20% for both UDP and TCP sessions compared with both non VPLS
scenario and non secure VPLS architecture. Thus, it concludes that the performance
penalty of security on throughput is independent of the transport layer protocol. On the
other hand, non secure VPLS reduces the throughput only by 1% than the non VPLS
scenario in both short and long TCP sessions. Therefore, the impact of VPLS tunnel
encapsulation on TCP throughput is very low. The additional layer of encryption is the
main reasons for the reduced average throughput of the secure VPLS architectures.
For open-source Linux-based implementations, the measurement results confirmed
the assumption that no single solution is optimal in all considered aspects and sce-
narios. OpenHIP for instance experienced a major throughput limitation as shown in
our experiment results, reaching a maximum of 100Mbps which does not seem very
promising for future networks, hence we recommend a hardware acceleration for IPsec
encryption as a possible means to remove this limitation. We also observed significant
variations in the performance of both implementations when the tunnel is left idle for
a prolonged duration, hence we recommend that tunnel maintenance capability be fine
tuned for optimal performance after recovery from an idle state. In general, both HIP
implementations have relatively low performance in terms of throughput, thus we rec-
ommend that future versions of both implementations focus on improving the network
throughput.
Furthermore, experiments for enterprise based solutions revealed that UDP through-
put is about 14% higher than TCP throughput for both secure VPLS and non secure
VPLS traffic. Thus, UDP based applications can obtain better throughput performance
than TCP based applications in a secure VPLS network as well. In general, secure
VPLS architectures have relatively poor performance in terms of throughput and it
opens new opportunities for research. Thus, the future secure VPLS architectures
equally need to focus on improving the network throughput.
The secure VPLS architecture increases the latency approximately by 46% for the
point to point approach and by about 87% for the multipoint approach, this increase is
largely due to encryption and tunneling delays in PE devices. This encryption delay
can be reduced by using high performing PE devices or by using efficient encryption
algorithms. The IPsec acceleration can be achieved by using external accelerators
and/or using new AES instruction sets for processors. Thus, the adaptation of these
techniques for PEs will improve the performance of secure VPLS networks.
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9. APPENDICES
Appendix 1 Technical specifications of Tempered Networks solution
206.452.5500
 Seattle, WA USA
www.temperednetworks.com
info@temperednetworks.com
100SNR1.0 / Page 2
Physical Number of Licensed
HIPswitches 
HIPswitch Conductor SMB 2-9 
HIPswitch Conductor ENT Unlimited
Network Connections: 2 x RJ45 Gig-E
Power: 350W Power Supply, 100-240VAC, 50-60Hz
Dimensions: 19.8”L x 17.2”W x 1.7”H
Mounting: 19” Rackmount, 1U Height
Operating Temperature: 0°C to +35°C
Humidity (non-condensing): 8% to 90%
HIPswitch Conductor &
SimpleConnect Interface
The HIPswitch Conductor is a scalable
orchestration engine that coordinates
con guration, security policies, trust
relationships, monitoring and analytics
between the  SimpleConnect UI and
distributed HIPswitches.
HIPswitch Conductor
Product Line
Create secure private networks
Delegate management of each private
network to authorized users
Add HIPswitches to private networks
De ne protected devices behind each HIPswitch
Con gure communication security policies for
HIPswitches and devices
Govern, audit and monitor private networks,
HIPswitches and devices
Once HIPswitch security appliances register to the HIPswitch Conductor, a user who is logged into the
SimpleConnect user interface is able to:
The SimpleConnect web-based user
interface enables single-pane-of-glass
administration throughout the life cycle of a
deployment.
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Pictured: HIPswitch-100g (4.6"L x 1.8"W x 1.5"H)
Pictured: HIPswitch-200g (4.1"L x 7.0"W x 1.6"H)
The HIPswitch-200 series of security appliances is a 
medium form factor, industrially hardened device with 
secure network throughput of 15 Mbps (megabits 
per second). They are optionally DIN rail mountable, 
accept a wide range of DC input, can connect to the 
untrusted shared network with wired Ethernet, WiFi, 
or 3g cellular connections and support failover across 
these different connection types.
Physical Network Connections
HIPswitch-100e 2 x RJ45 Gig-E 
HIPswitch-100w 1 x RJ45 Gig-E, 1 x 802.11 abg 
HIPswitch-100g 1 x RJ45 Gig-E, 1 x 3g cellular
Virtual Host OS Requirements
HIPswitch-100v Windows 7 / Windows 8
Throughput: 5 Mbps
Dimensions: 4.6”L x 1.8”W x 1.5”H inches
Mounting: Ruggedized Metal Channel Case,
DIN Rail Mountable 
Power: 8-42 VDC Input via Passive PoE, 2-3W Typical 
Operating Power
Operating Temperature: -40°C to +35°C
Humidity (non-condensing): 20% to 90%
Physical Network Connections
HIPswitch-200e 2 x RJ45 Gig-E 
HIPswitch-200w 1 x RJ45 Gig-E, 1 x 802.11 abg 
HIPswitch-200g 1 x RJ45 Gig-E, 1 x 3g cellular
Throughput: 15 Mbps
Dimensions: 4.1”L x 7.0”W x 1.6”H inches
Mounting: 20ga Metal Case, DIN Rail Mountable
Power: 8-48 VDC Input via multiple PoE or Barrel 
Jack, 
5-7W Typical Operating Power
Operating Temperature: -40°C to +85°C
Humidity (non-condensing): 20% to 90% 
The HIPswitch-100 physical product line consists 
of small form factor, industrially hardened security 
appliances with a secure network throughput of 5 
Mbps (megabits per second). They are optionally 
DIN rail mountable, accept a wide range of DC input 
and can connect to the shared network with wired 
Ethernet, WiFi, or 3g cellular. The HIPswitch-100v is 
a virtual HIPswitch for laptop or desktop computers. 
Throughout is dependent on the host.
Additional Speci cations: 
Power Options: PoE Injector
Cellular Providers: AT&T, T-mobile / Verizon / Rogers
Antenna Connections WiFi: RP SMA Female Main + 
Aux
Cellular: Single SMA Female
User Authentication Available: Yes
Additional Speci cations: 
Power Options: PoE Injector / Power Supply / 
Terminal Block Cellular Providers: AT&T, T-mobile / 
Verizon / Rogers
Antenna Connections WiFi: RP SMA Main + Aux
Cellular: Single SMA Female
User Authentication Available: Yes
HIPswitch-200 Series
HIPswitch-300 Series
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Pictured: HIPswitch-300 (9.8"L x 17.2"W x 1.7"H)
The HIPswitch-400 is a physical 1U rack mounted 
data-center grade security appliance. It has a secure 
network throughput of 850 Mbps (megabits per
second), and has 4 ports on the private network and 2
ports on the shared network.
Pictured: HIPswitch-400 (25.6"L x 17.2"W x 1.7"H)
Physical Network Connections
HIPswitch-300 6 x RJ45 Gig-E 
Virtual Host OS Requirements 
HIPswitch-300v VMWare ESXi 5.x 
Throughput: 60 Mbps
Dimensions: 9.8”L x 17.2”W x 1.7”H inches
Mounting: 19” Rackmount, 1U Height
Power: 200W Power Supply, 100-240VAC, 50-60Hz
Operating Temperature: 0°C to +35°C
Humidity (non-condensing): 8% to 90%
User Authentication Available: Yes
Physical Network Connections
HIPswitch-400 6 x RJ45 Gig-E
Throughput: 850 Mbps
Dimensions: 25.6”L x 17.2”W x 1.7”H inches
Mounting: 19” Rackmount, 1U Height
Power: 500W Power Supply, 100-240VAC, 50-60Hz
Operating Temperature: 0°C to +35°C
Humidity (non-condensing): 8% to 90%
User Authentication Available: Yes
The physical HIPswitch-300 is a 1U rack mount data-
center grade security appliance. It has a secure
network throughput of 60Mbps (megabits per
second), and has 4 ports on the private network and 2
ports on the shared network. The HIPswitch-300v is a
high throughput virtual security appliance that can be
deployed within data-center and cloud environments.
Throughput is dependent on the physical hardware.
HIPswitch-400 Series
